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SYMPOSIUM

Commentary
J. DARCO*

RICHARD

The article Bargaining and Discussion-Is It a Happy Marriage?,
by Barbara W. Doering,' presents an illuminating and accurate description of the bargaining and discussion activity which occurred during
the first year of existence of Indiana's Act2 establishing a system of collective bargaining and discussion for school employees. There can be
no serious dispute with Ms. Doering's conclusion that "a great deal of
time was spent in fruitless debate or maneuvering over the treatment of
discussible items." 8 As she suggests, procedural disputes indeed consumed an inordinate amount of time. The bickering over procedures may
well have impeded hard, constructive bargaining or discussion, call it
what you will, in many school corporations. Clearly, the emphasis
placed on resolution of procedural problems in many school corporations
retarded the education of the nonprofessional negotiators themselves as
to the requirements and methodology of the collective bargaining process.
The language of section 5 of the Act is that a school employer shall
discuss and "may but shall not be required to bargain collectively" about
certain specified items, as well as about "working conditions, other than
those provided in Section 4 .

.

.

."'

Thus, in private sector labor

terminology, any section 5 item constitutes a permissive subject of bargaining since the employer may, but need not, bargain about a section
5 item.'
To a seasoned professional negotiator in the private sector, the nice
legal distinction between a mandatory subject of bargaining and a permissive subject of bargaining is functionally a distinction without
a difference. In the process of table bargaining, if one party is willing to
make a concession on a mandatory subject of bargaining in return for
concessions on a permissive subject of bargaining, there is no particular
reason to differentiate between the legal characters of the items. After
*A.B. 1965, University of Notre Dame; J.D. 1968, Indiana University; Associate,
Bingham Summers Welsh & Spilman, Indianapolis, Indiana. The author's experience
has been in both public and private sector labor relations, and he has represented school
employees and employee organizations in proceedings arising under the Indiana Education
Employment Relations Act.
150 IND. L.J. 284 (1975), supra.
2 IND. CoDE §§ 20-7.5-1-1 to -14 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 28-4551 to -4564 (Supp.
1974) [hereinafter referred to as P.L. 217 or the Act].
"Doering, supra note 1, at 304.
lIND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-5 (1973), IN. ANN. STAT. § 28-4555 (Supp. 1974).
5NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).

1975]

SYMPOSIUM ON TEACHER BARGAINING

all, the ambition of the parties at the table is to arrive at a contract acceptable to both parties, not to engage in protracted legal discussions
on what is mandatory and what is permissive. However, the fact of
functional identity between mandatory and permissive subjects at the
bargaining table has been rejected, consciously or unconsciously, by
many school employers, probably out of a tran.cendent concern for
preserving the sanctity of the school board's decisionmaking process for
items perceived to be matters of school policy.
The impasse procedures established by the Act are not available
to resolve disagreements on matters which are being discussed rather
than bargained.' However, since all discussible items are permissive
subjects of bargaining, experienced mediators, v*Nhose aim is also to
arrive at a contract rather than to belabor legal questions, generally explore the possibility of concessions on mandatory items in return for
concessions on discussible or permissive items. If the mediator perceiVes that the employees place a very high priority on a section 5 item
about which the employer has declined to bargain, the mediator may be
expected to at least suggest to the employer the possibility of moving
that high priority item from the realm of discussion to the realm of
bargaining with a view toward settling. the entire contract.' Consequently, the functional identity of mandatory and permissive subjects
continues into the impasse procedure.
As mentioned by Ms. Doering, the obligation to discuss has been
interpreted in several decisions to require mutual exchange of points of
view in a meaningful way with a view towards reaching agreement.'
Under these interpretations, a school employer does not meet its obligation to discuss merely by listening to the employees and then taking
unilateral action. The statutory definition of "discuss"" refers to providing. "meaningful input," and the Tippecanoe decision requires that
each side, in fact, put something into the discussion process."0
0 See Doering, supra note 1, at 290 & n.37.

7Cf. Note, Determining the Scope of Bargaining Under th? Indiana Education Employmnent Relations Act, 49 IND. L.J. 460, 480 (1974).
8
Bobbe June Blom v. Tippecanoe School Corp., [Unfair Practice] Case No. U-7415-7865 (IEERB, July 5, 1974); Robert Brothers & Board of School Trustees of the
Delphi Community School Corp., [Unfair Practice] Case No. U-74-17-0755 (IEERB,
Aug. 21, 1974); [Consolidated cases] Sarah Borgman & Board of School Trustees of
the Baugo Community School Corp.; Sharon Poyser & Board of School Trustees of the
Baugo Community School Corp., [Unfair Practice] Cause No. U-74-11-2260-12; Donald
Bacher & Board of Trustees of the Baugo Community School Corp., [Unfair Practice]
Cause No. U-74-11-2260-11 (IEERB, Sept. 5, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Baugo].
9 IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-2(o) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4552(o) (Supp. 1974).
10 Bobbe June Blom v. Tippecanoe School Corp., [Unfair Practice] Case No. U-7415-7865 (EERB, July 5, 1974), at 12-13.
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These decisions interpreting the discussion requirement as imposing
on the employer obligations other than those of listening and then taking
unilateral action were rendered near the end of the bargaining "season"
under the Act; consequently, they have not yet been internalized by the
negotiators." Optimistically, one would hope that the employers' realization of the stringent requirements of the discussion process will temper
their intransigence to bargain permissive subjects. Since the requirements of good faith discussion so closely approximate those of good
faith bargaining, it would seem to be inadvisable for employers to continue wasting inordinate amounts of time determining whether a matter
will be bargained or discussed.
Nonetheless, in view of the difficulties which have arisen under the
present statutory language creating the dual obligation to bargain and
to discuss, and in view of the impediments which this dual obligation
has placed, whether necessarily or unnecessarily, in the way of the
efficient resolution of school employees' real problems and concerns,
the Indiana General Assembly would be well advised, during its 1975
session, to give strong consideration to eliminating the artificial distinctions currently existing between section 4 items and section 5 items."
EMPLOYEE DISCHARGE CASES

Indiana's Act has been considered primarily from the viewpoint of
systematizing and regulating the collective bargaining process for public
school employees. Ms. Doering's article deals exclusively with the bargaining and discussion requirements of the Act, and it is fair to assume
that these functions were foremost in the minds of the legislators when
the Act was being considered by the Indiana General Assembly. However, IEERB decisions in unfair practice cases in which employees claim
to have been discharged or otherwise discriminated against as a result of
their exercise of rights protected by the Act may, in the long run, prove
to be as important to both school employers and school employees as
the obligation to bargain and discuss.
The unfair practice provisions of the Act are directly modeled on
the unfair labor practice provisions of the National Labor Relations
1 The hearing examiner's recommendations in the Tippecanoe case were entered on

July 5, 1974, and automatically became an order of the Indiana Education Employment
Relations Board on July 25, 1974. The hearing examiner's recommendations in the
Delphi case were entered on August 20, 1974; the recommendations in the Baugo case
were entered on September 5, 1974. Both Delphi and Baugo are pending on appeal to the
full Board.
12 See Doering, supra note 1, at 309.
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Act." In several instances, the exact terminology of the federal statute
has been used in the Indiana Act. Section 6 of the Indiana Act is
analogous to section 7 of the federal act, 14 establishing rights of em-

ployees, while section 7(a) of the Indiana Act is directly modeled on
section 8(a) of the federal act. 5
During the Indiana Act's first year of existence 13 teachers were
petitioners in unfair practice complaints; 11 charged that they were
discharged in violation of the terms of the Act, while two claimed that
their work assignments were changed in violation of the Act. Approximately nine separate proceedings were brought, in two of which there
were multiple petitioners. The hearing examiners have entered recommendations in all but one of these proceedings. However, none of these
unfair practice proceedings have yet been considered by the IEERB
itself.
The hearing examiners have recommended remedial relief of some
nature for a majority of the unfair practice petitioners. The examiners
have recognized two separate bases for finding interference with protected rights in these cases. First, in several of the cases the hearing
examiner has found traditional private sector type discrimination to
have occurred as a result of the teachers' exercise of traditional private
sector rights, now incorporated into the public sector through the
Indiana Act. Among these traditional rights are the right to form,
join or assist employee organizations; the right to participate in collective bargaining; and the right to engage in concerted activities for
the purpose of improving working conditions.'
Second, and perhaps of more interest, the hearing examiners have
held that three of the petitioners are entitled to relief because the school
employer failed to meet its obligation to discuss their discharge or transfer and the circumstances giving rise to the discharge or transfer.' 7 The
school employers' refusal to discuss the teachers' circumstances has been
held to constitute an unfair practice under section 7(a) (5), thus entitling the teacher to relief.'
As to the traditional discrimination charges, the hearing examiners
13 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1970).
CODr § 20-7.5-1-6

"4Compare IND.

(1973), IND. ANN. STAT § 28-4556 (Supp. 1974),
with 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
15 Compare IND. CoDE § 20-7.5-1-7(a) (1973), IND. ANN. SrAT. § 284557(a) (Supp.
1974), with 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1970).
10 IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-7(a) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4557(a) (Supp. 1974).
17 Robert Brothers & Board of School Trustees of the Delphi Community School
Corp., [Unfair Practice] Case No. U-74-17-0755 (IEERB, Au&. 21, 1974); and Baugo.
18 See Doering, supra note 1, at 294-97.
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have relied heavily upon private sector authorities, as would be expected
in view of the close similarity of the statutory language. Various legal
defenses asserted by employers, many of which have been dealt with
in the private sector over a number of years, have been discussed by the
hearing examiners.
One such defense customarily raised by public employers in Indiana
is that the language of the statute 9 prohibits only discrimination undertaken for the purpose of encouraging or discouraging membership in
employee organizations, and that specific proof of intent to encourage or
discourage membership must be shown. This theory was rejected in
Whitbeck & School Town of Highland" in which the hearing examiner
held that discouragement of membership may be inferred from the
nature of the discrimination, and that evidence of the actual discouragement of employees is not required once discrimination is found to exist."In the Highland case, the hearing examiner also noted that although
the required discrimination must be shown to have been motivated by
anti-union animus, animus itself may be inferred if the conduct is "inherently destructive of important employee rights."2 2
In Brothers & Delphi Community School Corporation,8 a different
hearing examiner recognized that there would rarely be direct evidence
that an employer has discharged an employee for protected activities,
and consequently unlawful motivation of the employer had to be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the discharge. Evidence of
illegal discrimination has been inferred from the employer's failure to
give the employee notice of shortcomings which are relied upon as valid
justification for the discharge determination.
In Walton & Worthington-Jefferson Consolidated School Corporation," the hearing examiner inferred illegal discrimination from proof that a disproportionate number of association members were fired, that they were discharged without prior warning or reprimand, and that the explanations
given for their discharge were evasive. The timing of a discharge in
relation to the exercise of protected activities is also relevant to a
26

showing of discrimination.
'19IND. CODE §

1974).
20

21

20-7.5-1-7(a) (3)

(1973), IN.

ANN. STAT.

§ 28-4557(a)(3) (Supp.

[Unfair Practice] Case No. U-74-30-4720 (IEERB, Sept. 20, 1974).

Cf. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).

22 Highland at 16.
23

Robert Brothers & Board of School Trustees of the Delphi Community School
Corp., [Unfair Practice] Case No. U-74-17-0755 (IEERB, Aug. 21, 1974).
24Id.
25

[Unfair Practice] Case No. TJ-74-16-2980 (IEERB, Aug. 27, 1974).

281d.
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In the Delphi case, discussed above, the hearing examiner found
anti-union animus to exist by reason of the conduct of the school employer during negotiations."' This showing of anti-union animus during
the course of negotiations was relied upon to support a finding of discrimination in the discharge of the president and chief negotiator of
the teachers' association.
By Indiana statute, nontenured teachers whose contracts are not
renewed are entitled to "a written statement showing reason for such
dismissal."2 Thus, in every case in which a teacher alleges discharge
for illegal reasons, the teacher bears the burden of showing that the
reasons stated by the school employer are incomp ete, or pretextual in
nature. That burden has been met in several of the discharge cases
through proof that the teacher was not, in fact, guilty of the offenses
asserted by the employer, and frequently through the use of evaluation
forms which many school corporations regularly complete for each of
their teachers.2
In the Baugo case the hearing examiner, obviously weary of hearing evidence on teachers' classroom strengths and weaknesses, stated,
"The IEERB should not have to hear such evidence and should not be
asked to determine the competency of a teacher." 0 Admittedly, it is
not the primary responsibility of the IEERB to determine whether or
not teachers are competent; but in the standard situation in which the
school employer asserts that the motivation for the discharge was the
teacher's incompetence and the teacher asserts an illegal basis for the
motivation, the hearing examiners will be required to make some determination on competency so as to be able to determine whether an illegal
discharge has occurred.
Illegal discrimination has been found not only in cases in which
the teachers were engaged in protected activity on their own behalf,
but also in cases in which the teacher, as an officer of the local teachers'
association, has attempted to assist a fellow teacher in dealing with the
27Robert Brothers & Board of School Trustees of the Delphi Community School
Corp., [Unfair Practice] Case No. U-74-17-0755 (IEERB, Aug. 21, 1974). The employer had withheld pertinent information from the employee negotiating team for an
unreasonable period of time.
28 IND. CODE § 20-6-13-1 (1971), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4j17 (1970 Repl.).
However, the reasons given may be general in nature. Tilton v. Southwest School Corp.,
-

nd. App.

-, 281 N.E.2d 117 (1972).

29 Steven Walton & Board of School Trustees of the Worihington-Jefferson Consol.

School Corp., [Unfair Practice] Case No. U-74-16-2980 (IEERB, Aug. 27, 1974);
Linda Whitbeck & Board of School Trustees of the School Town of Highland, [Unfair Practice] Case No. U-74-30-4720 (IEERB, Sept. 20, 1974) ; and Baugo.
30 Baugo at 13.
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school employer. 3
As in the private sector, it is frequently the case that not one reason,
but several, have motivated the employer's decision to discharge. Some
of the motivating reasons may be valid (such as incompetency) while
others are illegal (organization membership). The problem of determining whether the employee is entitled to relief when only some of the
employer's reasons are illegal has been the subject of a substantial body
of federal authority, some of which is inconsistent semantically if not
in practice. The phraseology of the standards or tests developed by the
federal judiciary varies widely. 2
The issue has not caused great difficulty for the Indiana hearing
examiners. Relying upon federal precedent, they have consistently held
that the discharge of an employee need not be-motivated solely by antiunion discrimination in order to constitute an unfair labor practice. In
the Worthington-Jefferson case, the hearing examiner stated that
[t]he existence of some justifiable grounds for discharge of an
employee is no defense to a charge of discriminatory discharge
when the justifiable grounds are accompanied by the employer's
motive to discharge for union activity.88
Similarly, in Whitbeck & School Town of Highland, the hearing
examiner recognized that even if there were valid reasons for the discharge other than the organizational activities of the teacher, that fact
could not be allowed to negate the operation of sections 6 and 7(a) of
the Act. The hearing examiner there adopted a "but-for" test.

4

The

rule that the existence of some valid grounds for discharge concurrent
with other illegal grounds need not preclude relief has been adopted by
3
1 Baugo, and Robert Brothers & Board of School Trustees of the Delphi Community School
Corp., [Unfair Practice] Case No. "U-74-17-0755 (IEERB, Aug. 21, 1974).
82
E.g., NLRB v. Neuhoff Brothers Packers, Inc., 398 F.2d 640 (5th Cir. 1968);
NLRB v. Whitfield Pickle Co., 374 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1967). In Whitfield, the court
noted that "[a] company can have dominant motives, mixed motives, equal motives, concurrent motives, and bewildering combinations of these," id. at 582, but held that all that
need be shown to demonstrate entitlement to relief is that the employee would not have
been fired but for the anti-union animus of the employer, despite what other shortcomings the employee may have suffered. Id.
88 Steven Walton & Board of School Trustees of the Worthington-Jefferson Consol.
School
Corp., [Unfair Practice] Case No. U-74-16-2980 (IEERB, Aug. 27, 1974), at 19.
34
Linda Whitbeck & Board of School Trustees of the School Town of Highland,
[Unfair Practice] Case No. U-74-30-4720 (IEERB, Sept. 20, 1974), at 17. The same
standard as to the degree of discriminatory motivation which must be shown was adopted
in Larry Poyser & Board of School Trustees of the Concord Community School Corp.,
[Unfair Practice] Cause No. U-74-10-2270 (IEERB, Sept. 5, 1974) ; in Robert Brothers
& Board of School Trustees of the Delphi Community School Corp., [Unfair Practice]
Case No. U-74-17-0755 (IEERB, Aug. 21, 1974); and in Baugo.
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courts and administrative agencies interpreting the public sector collective bargaining acts of other jurisdictions. 5
Many of the school employers in unfair practice cases brought to
date have argued that the IEERB lacks the authority or jurisdiction to
order -a school employer to reinstate a teacher, even upon a finding that
the teacher was discharged in violation of the provisions of the Act.
Unlike the federal statute" and several other statfs' public sector acts,
the Indiana Act does not specifically authorize the IEERB to order
reinstatement upon the finding of illegal discharge.
Section 11 (b) of the Act, however, authorizes the IEERB to enter
such orders "as it deems necessary in carrying out the intent of this
chapter,"37 and section 9(d) (9) authorizes the IEERB to adopt rules
and regulations to effectuate this provision. 8 Pursuant to its rulemaking
power, the IEERB has adopted Rule 320.1 under which the hearing
examiner is required to recommend "such affirmative action by the
respondent as will effectuate the policies of the Act."
Despite the absence of express statutory authorization, the hearing
examiners have not been reluctant to recommend an order of reinstatement when appropriate. In both Brothers v. Delphi Community School
Corporation0 and Whitbeck v. School Town of Highland," the hearing examiners ordered reinstatement upon an analysis that once a discharge in violation of the provisions of the Act is found, reinstatement
is the only remedy which will effectuate the provisions of the Act."2
The only reluctance to utilize reinstatement as a remedy was expressed in the Worthington-Jefferson case.' There the hearing examiner stated that he might have reservations about ordering reinstate35 Kenosha Teachers Union Local 557 v. Wisconsin Employment Rel. Comm'n, 39
Wis. 2d 196, 158 N.W.2d 914 (1968); Muskego-Norway Consol. Schools Joint School
Dist. No. 9 v. Wisconsin Employment Rel. Bd., 35 Wis. 2d 540, 151 N.W.2d 617 (1967) ;
In re Summerfield School Dist. & Summerfield Educ. Ass'n, [Unfair Practice] Case No.
C-68-D37 (Mich. Employment Rd. Comm'n), 314 G.E.R.R. F-1 (Current Rep. 1969).
8 National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
87
ND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-11(b) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4561(b) (Supp. 1974).
88 IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-9(d) (9) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4559(d) (9) (Supp.
1974).
89 IEERB Rules & Regs. 320.1, reprinted in 555 G.E.R.R. E-1, E-7 (Current Rep.
May 20, 1974).
40 Robert Brothers & Board of School Trustees of the Delphi Community School
Corp., [Unfair Practice] Case No. U-74-17-0755 (IEERB, Aug. 21, 1974).
4Linda Whitbeck & Board of School Trustees of the School Town of Highland,
Practice] Case No. U-74-30-4720 (IEERB, Sept. 20, 1974).
[Unfair
' 2 Reinstatement was also ordered in the Worthington-Jefferson and Baugo cases,
discussed supra at notes 22-27.
43 Steven Walton & Board of School Trustees of the Worthington-Jefferson Consol.
School Corp., [Unfair Practice] Case No. U-74-16-2980 (IEERB, Aug. 27, 1974).
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ment if it were shown that only one of the reasons for termination was
the employee's exercise of protected activity, but that other valid reasons
existed, including incompetence. Although he did not find those other
valid reasons for termination in the Worthington-Jefferson case, he
suggested that where they did exist the remedy should perhaps stop
short of reinstatement.
Thus, the recommendations of the hearing examiners on traditional
discrimination cases have been consistent with the federal authorities
and decisions from other states in the public sector. These recommendations have yet to be considered by the full Indiana Education Employment Relations Board; however, the Board can be expected to continue
the development under the Act of strong and efficient protections against
unfair practices.
Obviously, none of these recommendations have, as yet, been submitted to judicial review, although such review can be expected. The
Indiana Adminstrative Adjudication Act- applies to decisions of the
IEERB.4 5 Review would be initiated either by the losing party under
section 14 of the Review Act, or by the IEERB, which can bring a
proceeding for enforcement of its order under section 27 of that act.
In either case, the judicial review would be limited to the record developed by the IEERB, and a de novo hearing would not be authorized.
As Ms. Doering notes in her article,' the hearing examiners in
the Delphi and Baugo cases found traditional discrimination in retribution for the teachers' exercise of protected rights. But in both cases they
went further than this, basing their decisions upon a finding of an unfair
practice by the school employer under section 7(a) (5) of the Act. In
the Delphi case, the hearing examiner found that the employer had refused to discuss Brothers' termination, and in the Baugo case, the hearing examiner found that the employer had refused to discuss the circumstances of Poyser's discharge and Borgman's reassignment to a
different school.
With respect to Poyser, the hearing examiner concluded that an
unfair practice under section 7(a) (5) had been committed by the employer's refusal to discuss the teacher's "contract renewal, teaching
methods, and student discipline."' 7 Alleged shortcomings as to teaching
methods and student discipline were two of the reasons advanced by
the employer as legitimate motivations for the discharge.
44

IND.ANN. STAT.

§§ 4-22-1-1 to -30 (Code ed. 1974).

45 Doering, supra note 1, at 292 nA4.

46 Id. at 294-97.
47 Baugo at 15.
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In both cases, the hearing examiner, acting to restore "the status
quo ante as nearly as possible,"'" recommended reinstatement as the
appropriate remedy for a refusal to discuss a discharge. In Baugo the
hearing examiner stated that "[w]hen handed a fait accompli, the
teacher[s'] right to discuss is destroyed unless the decision is reversed
and discussion is permitted before it is made again."' 9
This right of an employee organization to discuss the discharge or
reassignment of members of the bargaining unit before the action is
taken may well prove to be one of the most valuable statutory rights
provided to teachers by the Act. It will ensure that discharge decisions
are made only after a bilateral presentation of all the facts, not merely
upon the facts as unilaterally perceived by the employer. As the hearing
examiner stated in Baugo, "It seems to be little .enough to ask that personnel decisions be based upon input from those affected by them.""0
Because of the stringent requirements of the discussion obligation,
as noted in the Tippecanoe decision," and because of employer reluctance to even receive input in areas such as teacher nonrenewal, an area
which school employers have traditionally perceived to be solely within
their exclusive discretion, school employers can be expected to react
most unfavorably to the Delphi and Baugo decisions. Yet, as Ms.
Doering suggests, section 5 does not distinguish between individual cases
and general policies. Neither does the Act set a specific timetable for
discussion as it does for bargaining.52
CONCLUSION

The existence of hard bargaining on equal terms, as contemplated
by the Act, obviously depends to a considerable extent upon the concurrent existence of strong protections for teachers against unfair
practices, including discriminatory discharges or discharges without
the discussion required by the Act. If teachers were to have only minimal
protections against employer retribution for their having engaged in
protected activity, such as collective bargaining, they could not be expected to vigorously pursue their rights established by the Act. At the
present time, it appears that the IEERB is developing a system of
teacher protections under sections 6 and 7 of the Act which will insulate
48 Id.at 14.
4'Id.
50 Id.

51 Bobbe June Blom v. Tippecanoe School Corp., [Unfair Practice] Case No. U-74(IEERB, July 5, 1974).
15-7865
52 See section 12 of the Act, IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-12 (1973), INn. ANN. STAT. § 284562 (Supp. 1974).

324
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teachers from vindictive, discriminatory, or retributive discharges or
transfers. 8
Because of the inordinate waste of time on the issue whether matters
fall under section 4 or section 5 of the Act, the General Assembly should
give serious consideration to unfettering the bargaining process by moving most working conditions from the area of permissive subjects of
bargaining to that of mandatory subjects of bargaining.
5

s Thus, for example, in Baugo the complainant Sarah Borgmdn, who had been transferred from one school district to another, was a tenured teacher. Consequently, it would
have been exceedingly difficult for the employer simply to discharge her. A transfer was
probably the strongest act of retribution available to the employer under these circumstances.

